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We examine the determinants of capital flows to four developing countries during the 1990s
using   an explicitly disequilibrium econometric framework in which the supply and demand
for capital are not necessarily equal and the actual amount of the flow is determined by the
‘short side’ of the market.  We are thus able to detect instances of “international capital
crunch”—where capital flows are curtailed because of supply-side rationing—and to relate
these instances to movements in the underlying fundamentals.  The analysis highlights the
role of asymmetric information—as distinct from the traditional concern with default risk—
in conditioning capital flows.
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I.   INTRODUCTION
The principal purpose of this paper is to estimate developing country supply and demand
functions for international capital, allowing for the possibility of market disequilibrium.
We believe this creates a more analytical foundation for studying the determinants of
international capital flows compared to the prevalent approach that seeks to identify so-called
‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors.  In particular, the analysis highlights the critical role of asymmetric
information—as distinct from the traditional concern with default risk—in conditioning
capital flows.  The effects of asymmetric information are observed at various time horizons.
Analysis of short-term fluctuations and long-term prospects of capital flows to developing
countries remains of continuing interest to international financial economists and to
policymakers. For recent analyses and surveys, see e.g. Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart
(1996), World Bank (1997), Reinhart and Reinhart (1998), International Monetary Fund
(2000), Woo, Sachs and Schwab (2000), and Agénor and Montiel (1999). Following
resurgence in international capital flows to developing countries during the first half of the
1990s, the second half of the decade was characterized by significant turbulence, including
periods of considerable optimism or ‘exuberance’ as well as significant financial crises in
Latin America, East Asia, Russia and elsewhere.  There is some presumption, therefore, that
the supply and demand for capital may not be in ‘equilibrium.’  The supply of capital may
be rationed—i.e., a number of developing countries would be willing to acquire more
international capital at the prevailing cost of capital.  While some countries may be more
permanently constrained, many may be heavily rationed during periods of crisis.  It is
possible also that supply may exceed demand when international investors exhibit a high
degree of exuberance.
In this paper, we seek to make three contributions.  First, for four important emerging market
economies, we attempt to distinguish between factors that determine the supply of
international capital and those that determine the demand for such capital. Second, using
those estimated functions, we proceed to identify whether, and when, countries have been
capital constrained or, alternatively, have had access to an excess supply of capital.  Finally,
we argue, based on the results obtained, that the supply of capital flows to developing
countries is influenced not only by default risk but also significantly by asymmetric
information.  The extent and implications of the informational asymmetry vary considerably
over time.
Empirically, there are at least three different, but complementary, taxonomies of the
underlying forces driving capital flows.  Firstly, economists have traditionally tended to
analyze capital flows to emerging markets in terms of  ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors (see e.g.
Chuhan, Claessens and Mamingi, 1998; Taylor and Sarno, 1997; Agénor, 1998; Mody,
Taylor and Kim, 2001a).  In this context, country-specific or ‘pull’ factors are those seen as
reflecting domestic investment opportunities and risks, which draw in overseas funds, while
global or ‘push’ factors are held to reflect those influences that direct investment funds from
international money centers toward emerging markets.  Secondly, researchers have
sometimes focused more explicitly on the underlying characteristics of capital flows which- 3 -
are not directly observable, in particular their degree of potential reversibility (see e.g.
Claessens, Dooley and Warner, 1995; Sarno and Taylor, 1999a,b; Mody, Taylor and Kim,
2001b).
Perhaps somewhat curiously, the third potential taxonomy we have identified in this paper
is the least investigated but is the closest to standard economic analysis, namely the
identification of the supply of and the demand for capital flows to developing countries.
The most recent of such efforts that we have been able to identify is by Hajivassiliou (1986).
Eaton and Gersowitz (1980 and 1981) also use a supply and demand estimation framework
but they focus on the stock of publicly held debt to private creditors rather than on the
demand and supply of new flows from international markets.  Their data is for 1971 and 1974
and is, therefore, essentially an analysis of debt levels in a cross-section of countries.
Moreover, the debt levels are explained entirely in terms of domestic variables and global
factors play no role.  Hajivassiliou’s (1986) analysis for 1970-1982 is closer in spirit to that
presented in this paper but he does not focus, as we do, on estimating a time-varying measure
of the probability of capital crunches and also does not include global factors in his analysis.
By pooling the data, Hajivassiliou (1986) imposes homogeneity across countries that he
recognizes may not be appropriate.
There are a number of potential reasons why this most basic of economic taxonomies—
supply and demand—has proved least popular in the empirical analysis of capital flows.  In
the now more conventional push-pull analysis, for example, determining whether a factor is
global or country-specific is generally straightforward, although determining whether it
affects the demand for capital or the supply of capital, or both, may be econometrically more
difficult and, in any particular analysis, of less interest to the researcher than gauging its
overall impact on capital flows. Moreover, given the strong resurgence in capital flows to
developing countries during the early 1990s and the rapid repatriation of much developed
country capital in the aftermath of the various emerging market crises of the late 1990s, there
is perhaps a belief among many international financial economists that observed capital flows
do not necessarily always represent the balance of supply and demand in a clearing market.
This, however, is precisely the issue that we wish to address in this paper.  In particular, we
wish to analyze situations in which the supply of capital flowing to a developing country
outstrips the demand and, conversely, where demand for capital inflows outstrips supply and
there is capital rationing or a ‘capital crunch.’
Models of credit rationing, since the seminal analysis of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), are, of
course, well known.  The basic idea is that interest rates may not always be relied upon to
clear credit markets because lenders will be wary of lending to high-risk borrowers even if
they are offering to pay very high interest rates.  There may be an adverse selection problem
such that potential borrowers offering to pay very high rates of interest may thereby signal
that they are among the least creditworthy.  Thus, at some points in time, the demand for
credit may outstrip the supply of credit and there will be a ‘credit crunch.’  Mankiw (1986)
discusses the conditions under which the credit market may collapse in such circumstances.
Empirical analyses of credit crunches at the domestic level have been carried out by a- 4 -
number of authors; see for example Ding, Domac and Ferri (1998) and—in an explicitly
‘disequilibrium’ framework—Ghosh (1999) and Pazarbasioglou (1997).
To our knowledge, however, such an analysis of supply and demand in a disequilibrium
framework has not been conducted for the surge and subsequent volatility of international
capital flows in the 1990s.  In particular, we believe that the analysis presented in this paper
is the first attempt to investigate the time-varying dimension of capital crunches faced by
emerging markets in response to both global and domestic developments.
We estimate supply and demand functions for capital flows jointly for a country using a
maximum likelihood econometric technique.  The technique estimates the probability of
whether, according to the estimated supply and demand functions, supply is less than
demand at any particular point and whether, therefore, there is a capital crunch. Using this
methodology, we report estimates of supply and demand functions for capital flows to Brazil,
Mexico, Korea and Thailand, over the period 1990-2000, from which we can infer the
probability of a capital crunch having occurred at any particular point in time over the
sample.  Our results are strongly supportive of the postulated model.  The estimated
probability of capital crunch serves as an index of capital rationing by the market.  The
movement of this index accords well with underlying economic intuition and knowledge of
the recent history of international capital movements.  Pulling together the evidence on the
determinants of the supply and demand functions and the evidence of credit rationing, we
conclude that asymmetric information has a time-varying impact on capital flows to
developing countries.
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows.  In Section II, we discuss various potential
underlying causes of capital crunch, while in Section III we set out the econometric issues in
estimating a disequilibrium model of capital flows.  In section IV, we discuss the empirical
implementation of the model and the data employed.  Our results are reported and discussed
in Section V, whilst a final section summarizes and concludes.
II.   CAPITAL RATIONING: THE ROLE OF ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
There are three different manifestations of credit rationing in the context of international
capital flows. Fundamentally, all three are the result of asymmetric information.  However,
the consequences of the asymmetry in information materialize at different time horizons.
First, a group of countries may be more or less permanently rationed.  In the Stiglitz-Weiss
analysis, imperfect information with respect to the creditworthiness of borrowers leads
investors to ration the supply of capital rather than supply it to the highest bidder.  Although
this basic structure provides us with a useful explanation as to why interest rates may not by
themselves be enough to clear the market, it does not help explain the well documented surge
in capital flows to developing countries during the early 1990s and its equally well
documented reversal during the various crises of the late 1990s.- 5 -
Thus, a second consideration suggests that a reassessment occurs immediately after or around
the time of a financial crisis that generates capital rationing or, more dramatically, a
‘collapse’ in Mankiw’s (1986) words or a ‘sudden stop’ in Calvo and Reinhart’s (1999)
terms.
2 Mankiw notes that even if the probability of default does not change, the presence of
asymmetric information can cause significant shifts in the supply of credit when conditions
change even modestly.  Two possibilities exist.  Pertinent information may be revealed with
respect to the perceived risk and attractiveness of investing in that particular country, which
may, to a greater or lesser extent, be embodied in changes in the country’s credit rating
3 or in
movements in other variables such as the level of foreign reserves in relation to the level of
indebtedness.  Alternatively, the sudden drying up or reversal of capital flows may simply
reflect a herding or contagion effect, as financial crisis in one economy generates the
withdrawal of capital from another economy, creating a domino effect (see e.g. Calvo and
Reinhart, 1999, Calvo and Mendoza, 2000; Dornbusch, Park and Claessens, 2000).  Thus,
supply and demand curves may shift significantly, leading to temporary disequilibrium in
international markets.  In the empirical work reported below, we model the supply and
demand for international capital flows as stable functions of the underlying economic
fundamentals.  Hence, we are able to explain movements in the probability of capital crunch
by relating them to movements in measures of the economic fundamentals.  The residuals in
our fitted empirical functions may thus to some extent represent pure contagion or herding
effects.  However, as we shall see, we are in fact able to go a long way towards explaining
capital crunches in terms of movements in the underlying fundamentals.
Finally, in between the two extremes of (more or less) permanent credit rationing and
episodic rationing reflected in financial crises, one may also distinguish cyclical variations in
credit flows that are also the outcome of asymmetric information.  Several authors have
noted that credit flows are procyclical (see Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1999 for further
discussion).  Because creditors have imperfect information on borrowers, the premium they
charge leads to a preference for the use of cheaper internally generated funds for financing
new investments.  However, when growth rates increase, the value of the firm’s collateral
increases, the premium charged for external funds declines, and the extent of external credit
increases.  This process is labeled the ‘financial accelerator’ because the cheaper available
credit during a period of growth reinforces and accelerates that growth process.  However, in
a slowdown, the credit slowdown makes the deceleration more rapid.
                                                
2 Similarly, Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) refer to a ‘vertical’ supply curve for
international capital and the lack of substitutability between international and domestic
capital.
3 The evidence presented by Goldstein, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) and Reinhart (2001)
suggests that credit ratings are not generally forward-looking.- 6 -
In our empirical analysis, we find evidence of credit constraints on all three counts,
emphasizing the pervasive importance of asymmetric information in determining the supply
of capital flows to developing countries.
Previous empirical analyses have also highlighted the significant influence of information
asymmetries on international capital transactions.  However, these findings are essentially
cross-sectional in nature, i.e., informational asymmetry is used to explain differences across
countries in the level and composition of flows.  Ghosh and Wolf (2000) and Portes and Rey
(2001) find that ‘gravity’ models explain a considerable fraction of bilateral capital flows
between countries. Greater distance between two countries implies reduced volume of
transactions—and greater distance, Portes and Rey (2001) argue, proxies for asymmetry in
information.
4  In addition, Portes and Rey (2001) find that other variables that measure
informational distance, e.g., volume of telephone traffic and the number of branches of
multinational banks, also correlate positively with flows.  Though their interest is not in
capital rationing per se, their conclusion is of interest in the context of this paper.  An
implication of their finding is that portfolio diversification is not a major objective for
international investors.  Instead, investors are more likely to invest in countries with business
cycles that correlate with cycles in their own countries, a conclusion that is consistent with
the results of our paper.
Asymmetric information is consistent with a number of other observed features of
international capital flows and sovereign borrowing.  Gordon and Bovenberg (1996) identify
informational asymmetry as a key factor in explaining the empirical evidence on the limited
international mobility of capital.
5  Gertler and Rogoff (1990) conclude that asymmetric
information can especially dampen capital flows to poorer countries because they are not
able to offer sufficient credible collateral.  Kletzer (1984) also concludes that observed
quantity rationing of credit, exclusion of the lowest-income less developed countries from
private capital markets, and short-debt maturities are some of the consequences of
asymmetric information.  Drawing on the corporate finance literature, Razin, Sadka, and
Yuen (1998) note that the composition of flows to emerging markets suggests a pecking
order—foreign direct investment, followed by debt, and finally, equity—an outcome that is
consistent with asymmetry in information between domestic and foreign investors.
                                                
4 In his comment on the Ghosh and Wolf (2000) paper, Savastano questions whether physical
distance is a proxy for higher transactions costs.  The extent of informational asymmetry in is
as likely—or more so—to reflect the nature of institutions governing financial transactions
and while distance from the world’s main money centers may proxy in some cases for the
lack of institutional development, that need not necessarily be the case.  Moreover, in the
1990s, some crisis countries were quite close to major money centers and were yet plagued
by informational asymmetries.
5 Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) argue that transportation costs in goods can account for
segmentation of international financial markets.- 7 -
Thus, there is both theoretical and empirical basis for expecting informational frictions to
play an important role in determining the supply of capital to developing countries.  The
contributions discussed above invoke information asymmetries to explain the geographical
distribution of international capital flows, the mobility of capital, or the composition of
capital.  In contrast, we take an approach that, at the same time, identifies supply and demand
functions for international capital and allows for a time-varying characterization of
information asymmetries.  Time variation in information asymmetries has been found to be
important also in developed country financial markets (Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald,
1992).
III.   MODELING DISEQUILIBRIUM IN CAPITAL FLOWS:  ECONOMETRIC ISSUES
A capital crunch may be said to occur when there is excess demand for capital inflows to
the economy and the short side of the market—in this case the supply of capital flow—
determines the amount of capital inflow.  If we denote the demand for and supply of capital
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t denote white noise disturbance, β and γ are parameter vectors, and it is
understood that the vectors of explanatory variables may share some elements in common.
The econometric problem is then to estimate the parameter vectors in the system (1)-(3) and
to determine whether the market is on the supply or demand curve at any given point in
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Often, in empirical disequilibrium modeling, some indication of which side of the market
dominates is inferred from an examination of the price of the good or service whose behavior
is being modeled, under the assumption that a rising price indicates excess demand (so that
supply is the short side) and, conversely, a falling price represents excess supply (so that
demand is the short side).  The sample of data can be separated according to whether the- 8 -
supply or the demand schedule is in force and the model can be estimated in a fairly
straightforward manner (Fair and Jaffee, 1972).
This approach is not satisfactory in an analysis of capital flows, however, since, as discussed
above, interest rates may be unresponsive to excess supply or demand because of the adverse
selection problem in credit markets and the possibility of credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss,
1981).   Accordingly, we apply methods originally developed by Kiefer (1980) and Maddala
(1983) for estimating a disequilibrium model with unknown sample separation (see also
Amemiya, 1974 and Maddala and Nelson, 1974). With these methods, we proceed on the
basis that we cannot say for certain whether an observation belongs to the demand or the
supply schedule, but we can infer the probability of it belonging to one or the other.
More specifically, denote by θt the probability of a capital crunch occurring at any given
point in time—i.e. the probability that any given observation belongs to the supply curve -
given the observed amount of capital inflow, which we denote Ct:




t t C C C < = θ .( 5 )
where Ct
s and Ct





t are independently and normally distributed, the likelihood function








− Φ − − +















X C X C
X C X C
L
1 ]] / ) ' [( 1 ][ / ) ' [( ) / 1 (
]] / ) ' [( 1 ][ / ) ' [( ) / 1 (
σ γ σ β ϕ σ
σ β σ γ ϕ σ
(6)
where φ and Φ are the standard normal density and distribution functions respectively.
Intuitively, this form of the likelihood function weights the likelihoods that would prevail in
each regime by the probability of being in that regime given the data.  The model can then be
estimated by standard optimization methods.
We can also compute the implied probability of a capital crunch at any point in time, θt as
defined in (5), as:
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which is just the likelihood of being on the supply curve normalized by the total likelihood.- 9 -
IV.   EMPIRICAL IMPLEMENTATION
In this paper we are concerned with modeling supply and demand functions for so-called
‘capital market flows’—that is to say, bond, equity and syndicated loan flows—to a group
of emerging markets, namely Brazil, Mexico, Korea and Thailand over the period from the
beginning of 1990 through to mid 2000.
6  Data on bond, equity, and bank flows for this
period were added together to form an overall capital market flow series for each country,
with monthly observations on the individual bond, equity and syndicated loan flow series
obtained from Euromoney’s Bondware and Loanware.  These series represent gross capital
flows.
7
Before the model can be implemented empirically, however, it is clearly necessary to specify
what variables are to be included on the right-hand-side of each equation.  As noted above,
the literature has tended to distinguish between global ‘push’ and country-specific ‘pull’
factors in the determination of portfolio flows (see e.g., Chuhan, Claessens and Mamingi,
1998; Taylor and Sarno, 1997).  The approach taken here differs from the ‘push-pull’
approach in that both global and country-specific factors may determine the supply of capital
flows (although factors determining the demand for capital flows will in general be country-
specific).
On the supply side, the global ‘push’ factors we considered included variables such as the
level of both short-term and long-term US interest rates (represented by the yield on 1-year
Treasury bills and the yield on 10-year government bonds), the US high yield spread (the
spread charged for less than investment grade—or ‘junk’—bonds over the US Treasury bill
rate), a measure of industrialized country economic activity (proxied by an index of US
industrial production), and a measure of the cost of capital (the Emerging Markets Bond
Index (EMBI) of spreads over the US risk-free rate).  In addition, we also considered the
effect of country-specific factors that may influence the supply of portfolio flows, such as
country credit rating, liquidity position, domestic short-term interest rates, and stock market
returns.  Although credit rating may not be a good predictor of financial crisis (Goldstein,
                                                
6 We do not include foreign direct investment (FDI) flows in our analysis for two reasons.
First, as shown by Sarno and Taylor (1999a), the time series properties of FDI flows are quite
different from those of capital market flows.  Second, in keeping with these findings, studies
have also found that FDI flows tend to be driven by longer-term considerations such as
market size, infrastructure availability, education, and so on (see e.g., Mody and Srinivasan,
1998).
7 The resulting series were transformed to logarithmic form prior to the analysis. Where a
zero appeared for an observation, this was replaced with unity so that its logarithm became
zero.  Since the series are in millions of dollars, replacing zero dollars with one dollar will
not materially affect the empirical analysis.- 10 -
Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2000; Reinhart, 2001), one would nevertheless expect it to influence
the supply of capital to a particular country.  The ratio of reserves to short-term debt (debt
repayable within the coming year) was also included in the supply function on the
supposition that a decrease in its value would raise concerns about a country’s liquidity and
hence its ability to honor debts that are imminently due, making investing in that particular
country less attractive.
On the demand side we considered: (a) indicators of economic activity, such as the level and
rate of change of the consumer price index, the level of the domestic stock market index, the
level and rate of growth of domestic industrial production, and the reserves to imports ratio;
(b) a measure of the availability of alternative forms of finance: the ratio of domestic credit to
GDP; and  (c) cost of capital measures such as the domestic short-term interest rate and the
movements in the domestic stock market index; and also the international cost of capital as
proxied by the EMBI.
8
In the event, as we report below, not all variables proved significant and a more
parsimonious set of variables was sufficient to track the supply and demand for capital flows.
Thus, expected default risk in the US, proxied by the ‘high-yield’ or ‘junk’ bond spread (the
premium over risk-free bonds for less than investment grade credit), turned out to be
important in explaining supply of capital to the four emerging markets.  Default risk in the
United States could be correlated with emerging market default risk; moreover, Gertler and
Lown (2000) argue that a rise in the high-yield spread predicts slowdown in real economic
activity (through the ‘financial accelerator’ mechanism) and the anticipated slowdown could
rein in international capital flows.  Once high-yield spreads and US growth rates were
included, US interest rates did not play a statistically significant role and were dropped from
the analysis.  The level and change of domestic stock market indices were influential, the
former in generating demand and the latter in attracting supply, but domestic interest rates
did not prove to be a statistically significant influence.
Note that reserves appear both in the supply equation (where they are normalized by short-
term debt) and in the demand equation (where they are normalized by imports).
9  The ratio
of reserves to short-term debt measures a country’s liquidity and has become a prominent
indicator of a country’s vulnerability to capital flow reversals, especially since mid-1997,
following the triggering of the Asian crisis.  While a country’s credit rating should, in
                                                
8 We do not consider the effect of capital controls on the supply and demand for capital
inflows.  In part, this is due to Montiel and Reinhart’s (1999) finding that capital controls do
not influence the volume of capital flows.  In part, also, available measures of capital flows
are at an annual frequency and tend to be characterized in terms of discrete shifts.
9 Since the reserve variables only enter with a lag into our empirical equations, there is no
simultaneity bias induced in our estimation because of any effects capital flows may have on
the current level of reserves.- 11 -
principle, incorporate its liquidity position, in practice, ratings do not appear to have
systematically accounted for such short-term vulnerability.  The independent impact of
the ratio of reserves to short-term debt is confirmed in recent analysis.  For example,
Eichengreen and Mody (2000) find that a higher reserves to short-term debt ratio increases
the probability that a country will contract a new syndicated loan in international markets and
also lowers the spread charged on that loan.  Thus, in effect, a higher reserves to short-term
debt ratio shifts the supply curve outward.  In contrast, the reserves to imports ratio serves to
signal demand.  While it is the case that a decline in reserves relative to imports makes a
country more vulnerable to short-term risks, it also increases the demand for external
resources to finance ongoing imports.  Once again, Eichengreen and Mody (2000) find
support for the proposition that a fall in reserves relative to imports increases the probability
of contracting an international syndicated loan.
A full listing of the variables used in the analysis and their sources is given in the data
appendix.  The constructed database consisted of monthly observations for the period
1990:01-2000:06.  In our empirical work, we also allowed for some dynamic effects in the
data by entering these variables in the current period and with lags.
V.   EMPIRICAL RESULTS:  THE PROBABILITY OF CRUNCH
The results of maximum likelihood estimation applied to the models for Brazil, Mexico,
Korea and Thailand, using monthly data for the period 1990:01-2000:6, are given in Table 1,
where we report only our final parsimonious equations, i.e. the estimated equations where
variables which appeared with coefficients insignificantly different from zero
10 have been
deleted.  The estimated coefficients for the supply and demand functions are in each case
significantly different from zero and the signs of the estimated coefficients accord well with
our economic priors.
A.  Estimates of Supply and Demand Functions
A number of the results shown in Table 1 are particularly worth highlighting.  Superior
credit rating (and, hence, lower default risk) increases the supply of capital, as 0
expected.  The reserves to short-term debt ratio exercises an independent influence on
supply: a higher ratio is seen to have a strongly positive and significant impact in all
countries.  The prospects of higher returns (more rapid rise in the domestic stock market
over the past 12 months and higher available spreads) also increase the supply of capital.
The ‘financial accelerator’ mechanism—and hence a particular manifestation of asymmetric
information—appears to operate through two different channels:  US growth and the US
high-yield or junk bond spreads.  A higher growth rate of US industrial production has a
significant positive effect on the supply of capital.  Since US industrial growth proxies well
                                                
10 We use a nominal significance level of five percent throughout.- 12 -
for the cyclical behavior of global industrial growth,
11 the evidence suggests that capital
flows are strongly procyclical.  This evidence is consistent with the ‘financial accelerator’
model, which predicts that credit flows will be positive correlated with real activity
(Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 1999).  In turn, that model depends, as discussed above, on
the assumption of asymmetry in information between borrowers and lenders.  Higher growth
reduces the impact of asymmetry because it raises the value of the borrower’s collateral.  In
the context of cross-country capital flows, the collateral is presumably raised as export
prospects improve in a higher global growth environment.
As with the realized growth rates, anticipated changes in output also have significant effects
on the supply of capital. We find that higher US high-yield spreads are associated with
reduced supply of capital to emerging markets.  While the coefficients are highly significant
for all four countries, they are especially large for the Latin American countries. A rise in
these high-yield spreads, arising from an increase in expected default rates, acts as an
indicator of anticipated economic woes and proves to be a strong signal of economic
slowdown (Gertler and Lown, 2000).  This signaling of an economic slowdown is
particularly strong, Gertler and Lown (2000) argue, because a financial accelerator is at
work: higher spreads indicate worsening financial balance sheets, which in turn reduces
access to external sources of finance and amplify the extent of the economic downturn.
On the demand side, Table 1 also presents evidence that stronger domestic economic activity,
as reflected in the rate of growth of industrial production and the level of the domestic stock
market, increases a developing economy’s appetite for international capital.  These effects
are more pronounced in the East Asian countries.  Higher reserves in relation to imports
lower the demand for capital, as discussed above, though this again is the case especially in
the two East Asian countries.  Thus, a higher level of imports, all else equal, increases the
demand for capital, a finding that is consistent with that of Hajivassiliou (1986).
12  Moreover,
a higher level of international reserves in relation to imports has the effect of reducing the
demand for international capital and, in this sense, reserves are a substitute for international
capital; however, as discussed above, higher reserves in relation to short-term debt signal a
greater ability to repay and so are complementary to international capital flows.
13  Finally, a
rise in the cost of capital (i.e., a rise in the spreads as proxied by the EMBI) reduces demand
for capital.
                                                
11 Agénor, McDermott, and Prasad (2000) find that ‘business cycle fluctuations in developing
countries tend to be correlated with business cycle fluctuations in industrialized countries.’
12 Eaton and Gersowitz (1981) find that larger imports are associated with a reduced demand
for capital and consider that finding to be “anomalous.”
13 Eaton and Gersowitz (1980) conclude that reserves are a substitute for international capital.
But the statistical significance of their result is weak and may reflect, as we find here, the
dual role that reserves play: while they help finance current transactions and so are a
substitute to private capital, they give confidence to investors and help attract capital.- 13 -
Table 1.  Estimated Supply and Demand Functions for International Capital Flows
A.  Supply Function
    Brazil    Mexico     Korea   Thailand
(Credit Rating)t     0.195
   (0.071)
    0.144
   (0.032)
    0.145
   (0.035)
     0.132
    (0.051)
∆12(log of domestic stock market index)t     0.131
   (0.041)
∆12(log of domestic stock market index)t-1     0.016
   (0.003)
   0.157
  (0.041)
    0.174
   (0.053)
     0.183
    (0.053)
(Log of Emerging market spreads)t     1.274
   (0.482)
(Log of Emerging market spreads)t-1     0.245
   (0.111)
   1.202
  (0.224)
    1.211
   (0.424)
     1.584
    (0.643)
∆(US High Yield Spread)t    -0.916
   (0.443)
  -0.794
  (0.284)
   -0.197
   (0.044)
    -0.079
    (0.041)
∆(US High Yield Spread)t-1    -0.384
   (0.131)
(Reserves/Short-term debt) t-1     0.736
   (0.321)
   0.449
  (0.183)
    0.435
   (0.185)
    0.542
   (0.217)
∆(US Industrial Production)t-1     0.331
   (0.113)
   0.415
  (0.124)
    0.356
   (0.126)
    0.254
   (0.102)
Constant     6.411
   (2.012)
   7.874
  (2.001)
    3.252
   (2.002)
    4.085
   (2.002)
σ
s     1.306
   (0.350)
   1.114
  (0.333)
    1.254
   (0.225)
    1.156
   (0.331)
B.  Demand Function
    Brazil     Mexico    Korea   Thailand
(Log of domestic stock market index)t      0.379
    (0.302)
     0.429
    (0.122)
   0.778
  (0.302)
     1.079
   (0.302)
∆(industrial production)t      0.464
    (0.142)
     0.384
    (0.142)
   0.952
  (0.242)
    0.887
   (0.142)
(Reserves/Import)t-1     -0.100
    (0.424)
    -0.118
    (0.424)
  -0.209
  (0.084)
   -0.232
   (0.084)
(Log of Emerging market spreads)t     -0.983
    (0.484)
    -1.221
    (0.484)
  -1.017
  (0.284)
   -0.936
   (0.414)
Constant    13.495
    (2.002)
    -5.041
    (2.002)
  -8.874
  (2.002)
   -0.634
   (2.002)
σ
d      1.412
    (0.240)
     0.762
    (0.221)
   1.202
  (0.392)
    1.127
  (0.314)
     Notes :  Estimation is by maximum likelihood, as described in the text.  Figures in parentheses are estimated standard
                   errors. σ
s and σ
d denote the estimated standard errors of the disturbances in the supply and demand functions
                   respectively  (u
s and u
d).
                   ∆ and ∆12 denote, respectively the first- and twelfth-difference operators, defined such that: ∆xt ≡ xt - xt-1 and
                   ∆12xt ≡ xt - xt-12 .- 14 -
B.  Probability of a Capital Crunch
Using these estimated coefficients, Figures 1-4 show the fitted supply and demand functions
for each of the four countries over the estimation period, together with the probability (θt in
the discussion above) that demand exceeds supply at each point in time.
Consider first the Latin American countries (Figures 1-2).  The model clearly picks up the
1994 and 1998 crises, with the probability of a capital crunch at or around 100 percent in
each of these periods.  For both countries, the model suggests that the balance of probability
is that they were both still experiencing a capital crunch during the 1999-2000 period, with
the probability for Brazil bumping above 50 percent and that for Mexico around the 80-90
percent level.  Note, however, for both the Latin American countries, the early period of the
decade, was one of a relatively low value of θt.  In Mexico, for example, θt fell below 0.4 in
the early part of 1994, suggesting a short span in the first half of 1994 when supply exceeded
demand.  However, supply fell below demand some months before the onset of the crisis in
December 1994, as if investors were already backing off, and the severe constraint in supply
peaked only in mid-1995.  In Brazil also, after relatively benign capital market conditions in
late 1993 and early 1994, there was some choppiness in access from mid-1994, with the
constraint peaking, as in Mexico, in mid-1995.
The 1997 East Asian crisis is clearly captured in the results for Korea and Thailand, as is the
1998 crisis associated with Russia and the collapse of Long Term Credit Management
(Figures 3-4).  However, Thailand in particular shows a lower probability of a capital crunch
in the 1999-2000 period.  Indeed, the model generates a probability of crunch of around 50
percent, suggesting a clearing market.  For both Korea and Thailand, the period before the
July 1997 crisis is characterized mainly by an apparently  clearing market:  although θt falls
or rises for brief periods, it remains close to 0.5 during this period.  There may have been
exuberance in international capital markets at times during the 1990s, but it did not imply
that supply greatly exceeded demand at any given time.  Thus, during periods when the
supply curve moved to the right, it moved to fulfill demand at a lower cost of funds, so that
investor exuberance was reflected in sharply lower costs of funds in the 1996 and early 1997
periods.  From a peak of 2100 (spread in basis points over a dollar risk-free rate) in the first
quarter of 1995, following the Mexican crisis, the average spreads fell to 990 basis points in
the third quarter of 1997 before climbing back up as the various subsequent crises unfolded.
Overall, therefore, for the 1999-2000 period, the models suggest a high probability of capital
rationing in the Latin American countries and lower probabilities of capital rationing in the
East Asian countries.  Note our earlier finding that Latin American supply also falls more
sharply with a rise in US high-yield spreads.  This evidence of greater rationing of Latin
American economies is in line with that of Eichengreen, Hale, and Mody (2001) who show
that East Asian issuers are better able to time the issuance of their bonds than is the case for
Latin American issuers.  In other words, because East Asian issuers face less of a supply- 15 -
constraint, they can choose the timing at which they enter the market to take advantage of
favorable terms and conditions.
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C.  Domestic Factors Associated with  a Capital Crunch
While the models allow for a large number of factors to drive these results, it is worth
examining which of the underlying factors is particularly influential.  In this connection it is
also worth pointing out the differing behavior of reserves between these Latin American and
East Asian countries (Figures 1-4, panel c).  The ratios of reserves to short-term debt and
reserves to imports have risen strongly in Korea since 1997, as shown in Figure 3, panel c.
This will have contributed to increasing the supply of capital and reducing the demand, thus
tending to alleviate capital rationing and the probability of a capital crunch.  The same is also
true of the ratio of reserves to short-term debt in Thailand, although the reserves to imports
ratio appears to have stagnated and even slightly worsened after rising sharply.
The behavior of the reserves ratios in the Latin American countries is quite different,
however.  In general, the ratios are much lower and, in particular, the collapse in the reserves
to imports ratio in Mexico in the 1993-94 period coincides with a marked increase—indeed
a step change—in the probability of a capital crunch from which it never seems to have
recovered.  In Brazil, the reserves to short-term debt ratio is clearly strongly correlated with
the supply of capital and (inversely) with the probability of a capital crunch.  This is perhaps
particularly evident in contributing to the rise in the probability of a capital crunch during the
1999-2000 period.
The behavior of reserves, while an important determinant of both the supply of and the
demand for capital, clearly only tells part of the story, however, as this analysis is based on
multivariate modeling.  For example, the slightly increased probability of a capital crunch at
the very end of the estimation period for Korea mirrors a rise in demand for capital, in large
measure due to a recovery in economic activity reflected in an upturn in both output growth
and stock prices towards the middle of 2000.  On the other hand, the fairly flat level of
economic activity in Thailand, reflected in both output and stock price movements, during
the early part of 2000 translates into flat capital inflow demand, so that the Thai economy
does not appear capital rationed at that point.
                                                
14 Kletzer (1984) also argues that countries in Latin America, with their lower savings and
investment rates, are likely to be more credit rationed than East Asian economies.  This
conclusion follows from his analysis that high savings and investment rates are likely to
signal more productive uses of foreign capital.- 16 -
VI.   CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have examined the determinants of capital flows to a set of emerging
markets over a turbulent period, namely from the beginning of 1990 through to mid 2000.
We used an explicitly disequilibrium econometric framework in which supply and demand
are not necessarily equal and the actual amount of the flow is determined by the ‘short side’
of the market.  The econometric results were highly encouraging in that a parsimonious
model fits the data across the four countries.  The coefficient estimates have signs that accord
with our economic priors, are typically similar in magnitude across countries, and are
statistically well determined.
The results suggest that in the early part of the 1990s, as a fresh wave of capital began to
flow into emerging markets, demand for such capital was at times lower than supply.
However, the four countries considered adapted quite quickly to this new regime of
international capital flows and for much of the period, either supply and demand were in
balance or demand was constrained by supply.  This appears to have been the case even in
the ‘exuberant’ period of 1996 and the first half of 1997, when the spreads charged for
emerging market debt fell sharply: our results imply that as supply curves shifted to the right,
they did so along the downward sloping demand curve.  Moreover, we were also able to
apply the estimated models to gauge the degree of likelihood of instances of ‘international
capital crunch’—where capital flows are curtailed because of supply-side rationing.  The
results again accord with our economic intuition.
Our results also highlight the effects of asymmetric information, evident in protracted
rationing for some countries, in rationing during crisis periods for all the countries
considered, and in the strong procyclicality of supply of capital flows.  In contrast to the
earlier literature, which invoked informational asymmetries to explain cross-sectional
variations in the extent and composition of international capital flows, we show that there
may not only be some long-standing differences between countries in this respect but also
that significant changes may be induced in the supply of capital within a country over time
when information is asymmetrically held.
Further research might usefully extend this analysis to a more disaggregated level to identify
further the causes and implications of asymmetric information by types of flows (equity,
loans, and bonds) and identity of borrowers (private or public).  While some of that analysis
could be carried out within the framework of aggregate flows adopted in this paper, data on
individual transactions may become more relevant for other extensions.  Other possible
extensions include the possibility of examining contagion effects through including cross
linkages between supply equations for different countries and to study the demand for
international reserves in supply and demand constrained regimes (as suggested by Eaton and
Gersowitz 1980).- 17 -























































1991M01 1992M01 1993M01 1994M01 1995M01 1996M01 1997M01 1998M01 1999M01 2000M01
THETA









































































Mexican Crisis Thai Crisis
Korean Crisis
Russian  Crisis
Brazilian Crisis- 18 -
























































1991M01 1992M01 1993M01 1994M01 1995M01 1996M01 1997M01 1998M01 1999M01 2000M01
THETA










































































Mexican Crisis Thai Crisis
Korean Crisis
Russian  Crisis
Brazilian Crisis- 19 -




















































1991M01 1992M01 1993M01 1994M01 1995M01 1996M01 1997M01 1998M01 1999M01 2000M01
THETA










































































Korean Crisis Brazilian Crisis
Mexican Crises Thai Crises Russian  Crisis- 20 -




















































1991M01 1992M01 1993M01 1994M01 1995M01 1996M01 1997M01 1998M01 1999M01 2000M01
THETA









































































Mexican Crisis Thai Crisis
Korean Crisis
Russian  Crisis
Brazilian Crisis- 21 -
DATA APPENDIX
Variables Units Periodicity Source Series or ticker
symbol
International reserves US$ million monthly IMF, International
Financial Statistics
.1..DZF






















This index is market capitalization
weighted, with period data linked by
the chained Paasche method and







































Gross loan flows US$ million monthly Euromoney loanware
Gross bond flows US$ million monthly Euromoney
bondware
Gross equity flows US$ million monthly Euromoney
bondware
Short-term debt US$ million quarterly BIS Table 9A
Local stock market
price index




(1997=100) monthly Datastream and
World Bank staff
calculations
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